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ABSTRACT
In the past fifteen years key exchange rates have moved in larger
and more persistent ways than advocates of flexible rates in thelate 1960s
would have left anyone free to imagine. Certainly there was no expectation
of constancy for nominal exchange rates. But real exchange ratemovements of
30 or forty percent were definitely not suggested as a realistic
possibility. Moreover where these large movements did occur theydid not
obviously appear to be connected with fundamentals, andhence seemed
difficult to explain in terms of the exchange rate theories at hand.The
persistence of rate movements was as surprising as the rapidunwinding of
apparent misalignments when they did ultimately occur.
The past fifteen years provide a natural dividing line betweenthe
Keynesian and monetary approaches of the 1960s, and the morerecent analysis
that takes into account exchange rate expectations and portfolioissues,
which took off in the early 1970s as well as the brand—new approachesthat
concentrate on (partial equilibrium) uticroeconomicS. To reviewthese ideas
the paper starts with a brief look at the U.S. experience withflexible
exchange rates. From there it proceeds to the Mundell—Flemingmodel as a
comprehensive framework of analysis. The following sectionsdeal with
persistent effects of policy disturbances, links between exchangerates and
prices, the political economy of exchange rate movementsand the question of
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In the past fifteen years key exchange rates have moved in larger
and more persistent ways than advocates of flexible rates in the late 1960;
would have left anyone free to imagine. Certainly there was no expectation
of constancy for nominal exchange rates. But real exchange rate movements of
30 or forty percent were certainly not suggested as a realistic possibility.
Moreover where these large movements did occur they did not obviously appear
to be connected with fundamentals, and hence seemed difficult to explain in
terms of the exchange rate theories at hand. The persistence of rate
movements was as surprising as the rapid unwinding of apparent misalignment;
when they did ultimately occur. Research on exchange rate economics has
grown tired searching for risk premia determinants or for new macroeconomic
models. With a shift of interest toward the microeconomic effects of
exchange rate movements research is now turning in a fresh direction. It is
therefore a good time to take stock of what is known of exchange rate
economics, what has been learnt since the early 1970s and where more
research needs to be done.
The past fifteen years provide a natural dividing line between the
Keynesian and monetary approaches of the 1960s, and the more recent analysis
that takes into account exchange rate expectations and portfolio issues,
which took off in the early 1970s as well as the brand—new approaches that
concentrate on (partial equilibrium) microeconomics. To review these ideas
the paper starts with a brief look at the U.S. experience with flexible
exchange rates. From there we proceed to use the Mundell—Fleming model as a2
comprehensive framework of analysis. The following section draws attention
to persistent effects of policy disturbances. The next three topics deal
with the link between exchange rates and prices, the politicaleconomy of
exchange rate movements and the question of policies toward excess capital
mobility.
-I.The U.S. Experience With Floating Rates
The most striking result of the flexible rate experience is the
recognition that the "law of one price" is a poor description of the facts.
Figure 1 shows the real exchange rate of the U.S. dollar over the past ten
years.In the transition from fixed rates to floating in the early 1970s
(not shown) the dollar depreciated by nearly 40 percent. An index o4
competitiveness in manufacturing (using the IMF series shown in Figure 1.)
stood at 155 in 1968—70 and fell to 112 by 1973—75 which is also about the
average for the period 1975—86. Over the next ten years the dollar
depreciated sharply until 1980. Then appreciation ensued, raising the dollar
well above the level of the 1970s. Since 1985 the dollar has beenon a
slide, taking it back by late 1986 to the average of the 1970s.
Table 1 shows some recent facts for the international sector of the
U.S. economy to highlight the large—scale shifts that have takenplace. Net
exports have moved to a large deficit, import penetration has increased
dramatically in just a few years and the net investment position now shows
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net investment position data, especially in that it reckons direct
investment at historical cost, but the fact that the position has
deteriorated is not in question.
Table 1 U.S. External Balance Problems
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Real Exchange Rate* 90 101 110 113 118 121
(Index 1980—82=100)
Net Exports 1.2 1.1 0.8 —0.2—1.7 —2.0
(NIA, Percent of GNP)
Import Penetration (7.)
Capital Goods 14.6 17.0 19.7 24.6 29.6 29.2
Consumer Goods 6.9 7.4 7.7 8.7 10.7 10.B
Service Trade (S Bill.)
Investment Income 30.4 34.1 29.5 25.4 19.1 24.7
Other Net 4.0 6.9 7.3 4.8 0.8 —1.2
Net Investment Position 106 141 147 106 28 —60
(S Bill.)
*The real exchange rate index is reported in Morgan Guaranty World Financial
Markets and refers to competitiveness in manufacturing.
The recognition that real exchange rate changes have taken place on
a massive scale, and that they have major and potentially persistent
macroeconomic effects, points to several important directions for research:
Why do exchange rate move so much and so persistenly?
Does the fact that real exchange rates remain misaligned so
persistently imply that they must therefore ultimately overshoot
to remedy the accumulated consequences of over— or undervaluation?4
Does a review of available theories and evidence suggest that exchange
exchange rate movements are based on irrational speculation rather
than fundamentals?
• What are linkages between movements in the exchange rate and
changes in relative prices?
• Do the large and persistent movements lead to the inevitable
conclusion that exchange rate management offers a chance for better
macroeconomic performance? If so, what is the externality, and thus
what is the appropriate policy instrument, exchange rate oriented
monetary policy or a reduced scope for capital movements?
We are certainly not at a point to answer these questions in a
satisfactory manner. But it is worthwhile seeing where the literature has
gone and what suggestions are available. We start by asking whether the
standard models of exchange rate determination can give a satisfactory
account of rate movements in the past decade.
1. Why Do Exchange Rates Move?
There are two standard models of exchange rate determination. One
focuses on an expectations—augmented, open economy IS—LM model in the
tradition of Meade, Fleming, and Mundell. The other highlights the role of
portfolio diversification and relative asset supplies. In choosing between
these models an important question is to decide how relevant portfolio
diversification effects are as part of an explanation for exchange rate
movements. In other words, are monetary and fiscal policy most of the story
or do relative supplies of debts and other claims also play an important
role?5
The Extended Mundell—Fleming Model:
The textbook model today is an open economy IS—UI model with perfect
capital mobility, sluggish price adjustment, rapid asset market or interest
rate adjustment, and rational expectations in asset markets.
A streamlined version is written in log—linear form and takes output
as given. Complications stemming from output adjustments can easily be
introduced but do not actually change the basic dynamics. In the same way we
do not explicitly focus on wage—price interaction.1
in—p =hi (1)




Here inandp are the nominal money stock and prices, i and e are the nominal
interest rate and the exchange rate respectively, and g is a variable
representing fiscal policy. l1 variables other than interest rates are in
logs.
1See Dornbusch (197ó; 1980). Some o4 the extensions are considered in
Dornbusch (1986).6
Equation (1) represents monetary equilibrium or the UI schedule.
Equation (2) states that with an adjustment for anticipated depreciation,
assets are perfect substitutes. Perfect foresight is imposed by equating
actual and anticipated depreciation. Equation (3) specifies that price
adjustment is linked to the excess demand for goods which in turn depends on
the real exchange rate, fiscal policy and the real interest rate.
This model exhibits the familiar overshooting property: A one time
monetary expansion leads to an immediate depreciation of the exchange rate.
The exchange rate overshoots its new long run level——which is proportional
to the increase in money. In the transition period, following the initial
overshooting the exchange rate appreciates while prices are rising. The
process continues until the initial real equilibrium is re—established.
Wilson (1979) has shown that this model also lends itself to the
investigation of currently anticipated disturbances or of transitory
disturbances. This exercise highlights the flexibility of asset prices which
move ahead of the realisation of disturbances. Exchange rates move
immediately, driven entirely by anticipations, and bring about alterations
of prices and interest rates before any monetary or fiscal changes are
actually implemented.
The strong feature of the model is the contrast between instantly
flexible assets prices which are set in a forward looking manner, and the
sluggish adjustment of prices. The linkage of the domestic asset market to
foreign rates of interest produces exchange rate dynamics which yield the7
required rate of return on home assets. Any Hnewsu will make the exchange
rate jump instantly to that level such where the expected capital gains or
losses precisely offset the nominal interest differential. In this sense the
structure is extraordinarily rigid, just as was the original Mundell—Fleming
model.
Of course, there is room for some flexibility: output adjustment can
be brought into the model, import prices can appear in the real money
balances deflator or a 3—curve can be introduced to allow a more gradual
response of demand to the real exchange rate. But these are niceties that do
not add much to the basic flavor of the results.
Fiscal Policy
A major insight comes from a different application: fiscal policy. A
fiscal expansion in this model brings about currency appreciation. Fiscal
expansion creates an excess demand for goods, leading to an expansion in
output or prices and hence, with a given nominal money stock, to upward
pressure on the interest rate. Incipient capital inflows bring about an
exchange rate appreciation and full crowding out. This is, of course,
exactly the property captured by the Mundell—Fleming model. Fiscal policy
works in the way they described even when price adjustments and expectations
are introduced.8
An interesting extension is to consider a transitory fiscal
expansion. This corresponds, for example, to the U.S. experience of the
l980s. Suppose that fiscal policy follows an adjustment process such as:
g v(g— ') (4)
whereis the long run level of government spending. According to (4) a
fiscal expansion is being phased out over time at the rate .
Nowsuppose that at time T a fiscal expansion to level g0 takes
place and that from there on fiscal policy will follow the rule of (4). It
is possible to solve for the path of the real exchange rate to establish the
following results: There will be an immediate real appreciation. Then, under
the impact of excess demand, prices will keep rising so that further real
appreciation occurs. Over time the exchange rate overvaluation builds up
even as the fiscal policy is being wound down. A recession develops which
now forces deflation and hence gradually a return to the initial level of
the real exchange rate.
If a future transitory fiscal expansion is anticipated or is
gradually phased in, the adjustment process is somewhat more complicated.
The adjustment path is shown in Figure 2. Upon the news of the fiscal
program there will be an initial nominal and real appreciation shown as a
jump from A to B. Then the overvaluation exerts a deflationary pressure. As




Figure 2 The Real Exchange Rate Effect of a
Transitory Fiscal Expansion9
match the lower interest rate the exchange rate will be appreciating. That
process continues until the fiscal expansion actually gets underway, and
leads to excess demand and inflation. Only when real balances and hence
interest rates have been pushed up beyond their initial level, does the
corrective depreciation start. The depreciation then continues, along with
the phasing out of the fiscal expansion, until the initial equilibrium is
restored.
Fiscal policy thus appears in addition to monetary policy as an
important driving force for the exchange rate. Sustained shifts in
government spending or taxes will bring persistent movements of the real
exchange rate. Feldstein (1986) and Hutchinson and Throop (1985) have
documented that shifts in the full employment budget, along with real
interest rates, can in fact explain the large shifts in real exchange rates
that have occurred. Interestingly the empirical tests hold up not only for
the very recent experience in the United States. They work equally well when
applied to multilateral exchange rates for the entire floating rate period.
Fiscal policy, including the expectations of correction associated
with Grame—Rudman, provides one interpretation of the dollar movements in
the 1980s. The alternative is to argue the case or at least partial
irrationality as has been done by Frenkel (1985), Frankel and Froot (1986)
and Krugman (1986).10
11. Persistence Effects
Three feature5 of the extended Muundell—Fleming model account for
its strong and unambiguous predictions. First, the absence of any effects,
dynamic or otherwise, associated with the current account. Second, that
home and foreign assets are perfect substitutes. Third, that there are only
two classes of assets, money and bonds, and no real assets. We consider now
what alternative models might look like and what they imply for exchange
rate economics.
Current Account Effects
A period of fiscal expansion leading to appreciation will also
involve cumulative current account imbalances. The case of the United States
stands out, as now more than 2 percent of GNP is borrowed from the rest of
the world in financing the persistent deficit, adding in each year to come
to a seemingly ever growing external indebtedness (See Figure 3). Sometime
in 1985 the U.S. passed from net creditor to net debtor status.
The accumulated net external indebtedness will, of course, show up
in the current account in the form of reduced income from net foreign
assets. The reduction in net external assets means that following a period
of deficits the current account cannot be balanced simply by returning to
the initial real exchange rate. Now there will be a deficit stemming from
the increased debt service. Therefore, to restore current account balance,
an overdepreciation is required.11
The current account can be represented in the following manner. Let
d be the net external assets and i* the rate of return on net foreign
assets. The term d denotes the current account surplus or accumulation of
net foreign assets:
df(e—p,g) +i*d (5)
The real exchange rate that yields current account balance will therefore
depend on the rate of return on assets and on the cumulated history of
fiscal policy and other shocks to the current account. A transitory fiscal
binge requires a subsequent permanent real depreciation to yield the
improvement in the non—interest current account that is necessary to service
the debt.
Such a permanent response to transitory deficits is clearly not part
of the standard model. The question is whether it represents a realistic,
quantitatively important effect. This is the case addressed in trade theory
under the heading of the 1transfer problemu. it depends in large part on the
impact on demand for domestic goods of an international redistribution of
wealth and spending, and on the production response to changes in relative
pri ces.
The discussion of the transfer problem is not complete without a
consideration of how the budget will be balanced. The fiscal expansion gives
rise to a budget deficit which is financed by issuing debt. The debt in turn12
will have to be serviced at some point by increased taxes. The question
then is whether the taxation yields an equal current account improvement at
constant relative prices.If so then there is no need for terms of trade
adjustments. At the going levels of output disposable income and absorption
by domestic residents decline but part of reduced spending fails on domestic
goods rather than imports. To achieve the transfer at full employment
ordinarily requires a real depreciation. The real depreciation will shift
demand toward domestic goods.
This discussion of fiscal policy effects on real exchange rates
clearly provides scope for an application of the Barro—Ricardo equivalence
ideas to the open economy. A particularly complete rendition is offered in
Frenkel and Razin (1986).
Portfolio Effects:
A separate persistence effect can arise via the impact of a fiscal
and current account imbalances on the relative supply of assets. Suppose
that, contrary to (2), assets are not perfect substitutes so that there is a
risk premium:2
2The formula for the risk prem2um here omits wealth terms. It also
focusses on debt rather than all nominal outside assets. For a more





Figure 3 U. S. Net Exports
1977 1979 1981 1983
-2.8
1985
(NI, % of GNP)13
=j*+e+z(b—b*—e) (2a)
where b and b* are the supplies of domestic and foreign debt in national
currencies.
If current account imbalances are financed by an increase in the
relative supply of domestic debt, then the cumulative imbalance would
require an increase in the relative yield on domestic securities or a change
in the relative valuation via exchange rate changes. A depreciation would be
a means of correcting on increase in the relative supply of domestic
securities by reducing their value in foreign currency, thus restoring
portfolio balance at an unchanged yield differential. Other thingsequal we
would therefore expect a period of debt accumulation to have a permanent
In a model with a risk premium there is a serious difficulty in
linking goods and assets markets. There is certainly no excuse for
using the interest rate on bonds in home currency as 'the' domestic
interest rate used as a determinant of domestic spending. The ad hoc
model becomes a liability.The correct treatment, drawing on an
optimisation model would use the marginal cost of capital which is
based on the marginal financing pattern which in turn is derived by
solving the firm's and household's complete intertemporal optimisation
probi em.14
effect on exchange rates, so as to bring interest differentials in line with
the changed relative supply of assets.
The responsiveness of exchange rates to relative asset supplies has
been addressed in a number of important papers by Frankel.4 He concludes
that relative asset supplies in fact do not provide a satisfactory account
of relative yields, at least in the context of a capital asset pricing
model. The impact of relative asset supplies is practically negligible. That
is an uncomfortable conclusion for a whole strand of research which places
major emphasis on the imperfect substitutability of assets as a major
feature of open economy macroeconomics.
Work by Sachs and Wyplosz (1984), Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) and
Giovannini (1982) raises the following problem: if as a result of debt
accumulation, via the transfer problem or via risk premia, an ultimate
depreciation is required, why should we expect an initial appreciation? Is
it not likely that for certain parameters and paths of subsequent budget
correction there should be an immediate path of sustained real depreciation.
It turns out that all the parameters in the model——trade elasticities,
wealth elasticities, risk premium responses, etc.——matter for this question.
Even in very highly simplified models no firm conclusions emerge about the
path of the exchange rate.
4See especially Frankel (1985,198) and Frankel and Froot (1986).15
Real Assets:
The standard model remains oversimplified even when long—term issues
ofcurrentaccount balancing and a risk premium are taken into account. The
simplification lies in the omission of real capital from portfolios, and in
disregarding the effect over time of investment on the capital stock and
thus the supply side of the economy.
Concurrently with the imbalance in the current account and the
resulting shift in net foreign assets, capital accumulation takes place.
Portfolio adjustments in response to the changing relative asset supplies
bring about changes in the value of real assets and in relative yields. The
flow of investment and the changes in the value of real capital potentially
dominate the effects of current account imbalances. A good week on the stock
market produces a change in wealth that is several times the magnitude of
an entire year's deficit in the current account. While it is true that the
current account is important because persistent imbalances cumulate, exactly
the same argument must be made for investment.
Work by Gavin (1986) shows that the inclusion of the stock market in
the standard model offers important additional channels for exchange rate
dynamics. Unfortunately the inclusion ofthe stock marketremoves at the
same time the simplicity ofthestandard model. Now virtually anything is
possible. nd that result is arrived at by looking only at the portfolio
implications of a money—debt—capital model and the ensuing yield and wealth16
effects, without even taking into account the accumulation of physical
capital. Among the sources of ambiguity are two different effects: an
expansion in demand will bring about both an increase in output and an
increase in interest rates. The net effect on the valuation of the stock
market is therefore uncertain. Thus wealth may rise or fall, and this is
important in judging the induced effects on money demand and spending. The
second important consideration is the relative substitutability of money and
debt, and debt and capital. This is relevant for the extent of yield changes
and hence for the direction and magnitude of exchange rate changes.
The money—debt—capital model is also important in highlighting that
current accounts are not necessarily financed by sales of domestic bonds or
foreign bonds. There need not be any link between cumulative current account
imbalances and yield differentials between home and foreign nominal bonds.
There would be a significant distinction, for example, between fiscal
deficits and investment deficits. The difference is also relevant from the
point of view of the transfer problem. Deficits that arise as a result of
increased investment have different implications from deficits that have
their source in fiscal imbalances.
Hysteresis Effects:
A final channel for persistence effects is introduced by an
industrial organization approach to the consequences of extended rate
misaligneents. When an industry is exposed to foreign competition and entry17
by a persistent overvaluation it may close down and perhaps even reopen in
the low wage country. Firms already producing in the low wage country may
make the necessary investment to enter the market where home firms are
handicapped by overvalued labor. A period of overvaluation or undervaluation
thus changes the ndustria1 landscape in a relatively permanent fashion.
These considerations are at the center of a new literature that seeks to
interpret the U.S. experience following the five year overvaluation. The
upshot of the literature is, of course, that overvaluation leads ultimately
to the need for overdepreciation to remedy the accumulation of adverse trade
effects.
Overvaluation, for example due to monetary contraction or fiscal
expansion brings in foreign firms and displaces domestic firms. When the
overvaluation is ultimately undone the foreign firms are still there and the
domestic firms may exist no longer. Worse yet, they now may even be
producing abroad. A period of sustained undervaluation is required to bring
forth the required investment. The possibility of entry and the choice of
labor market from which to supply a particular market, thus opens an
important dynamic theory of adjustment to the exchange rate. Expectations
about the persistence of changes in relative labor costs become important
for the determination of relative prices. Now pricing between firms not only
See especially Baldwin (1986), Krugman (1986) and Baldwin and Krurnan
1986).18
involves current strategic interaction, which we consider below, but also
the impact of pricing strategies on entry, location and investment.
There is some offset to these considerations from the side of factor
prices. To the extent that an industry has a captive factor supply we would
expect that wages come down with the exchange rate, thus maintaining a firm
in existence. Conversely, in expanding countries wages might rise and thus
offset some of the gain in profitability arsing from depreciation.
III. Exchange Rates and Pricing
The monetary approach to the balance of payments used purchasing
power parity (PPP) as an essential ingredient in explanations of exchange
rate determination. Today PPP is certainly no longer a cornerstone. for
modelling. Attention has shifted to modelling changes in equilibrium
relative prices. The simple Keynesian model assumes that wages and prices in
the national currencies are given, so that exchange rate movements change
relative prices one—for—one. A newer approach recognizes the sluggishness of





An interesting setting for exchange rate—wage—price relationships is
a world of imperfect competition. Here firms are price setters. They may or
or may not interact strategically, but they certainly face the problem of
how their pricing decision should react to a change in the exchange rate.
Consider the simple case of an oligopoly.7
The typical setting would be the following. We look at the home
market where n home firms and n* foreign firms compete. The profits of the
typical home and foreign firms, with constant unit labor costs in their
respective currencies given by w and w*, are:
J =(p1—w)D(p,p) (6)
(7)
These profits are maximized subject to the strategic assumptions
about the determinants of the demand facing each firm and the responses of
other firms in the market. It is clear that there is no general solution to
the problem. The impact of an exchange rate change on equilibrium prices
will depend on a number of factors. Specifically these include:
7This analysis draws on Dixit (1956) and Seade (1923).20
.whether goods are perfect substitutes or differentiated products
.the market organisation——oligopoly, imperfect competition, etc.
.the relative number of domestic and foreign firms
.the functional form of the market demand curve
Even though there is no presumption about the effects of exchange
rates on the changes in equilibrium prices, it is immediately clear that
there is an important link between open economy macroeconomics and
industrial organisation. There is no presumption that an exchange rate
movement affects all markets equally. Some markets may involve a homogeneous
good and, for example, a duopoly. Other markets may involve differentiated
products and Chamberlinian competition. Yet other markets may be close to
perfect competition. But whichever is the case, once the exchange rate
changes, given wages, there will be an adjustment in the equilibrium price.
Of course this pricing issue, depending on market organisation, may be
repeated at different levels from import to retail. The same pricing issue
arises on the export side..
For the case of differentiated products an appreciation tends to
bring about a rise in the relative price of domestic goods. Imported
variants decline in price both absolutely and relatively. For homogeneous
products the industry price declines, with the decline being larger the less
monoplized the market and the larger the relative number of foreign firms.21
An interesting, and perhaps surprising, result appears here:currency
appreciation, in certain cases, may lead to a more than proportionate
decline in market price. This result occurs because the favorable cost shock
for foreign firms makes expansion overly profitable and overcomes the
tendency to preserve profits by restricting output. But these results are
very specific to market structure and functional form. In public finance, as
Seade (1983) has shown, a similar result occurs: a tax on an oligopolistic
industry may raise profits.
To show how specific the results are to the details of the market,
consider a simple duopoly market with a domestic and a foreign firm. Let the
inverse market demand function be:
P=P(Q) ;P'(Q)<O, QE q+q* (8)
where 0 denotes total quantity demanded and q and q* are the supplies by the
home and foreign firm. Let the elasticity of the slope of the inverse
demand function be denoted by c:
c =—(P"/P')Q (9)
which may be zero, as in the linear case, positive or negative.22
Suppose that each of the two firms assumes that the other maintains
a given level of output. The equilibrium then is the Cournot—Nash solution
for industry output and price. The elasticities of output, and of the
industry price in response to an exchange rate change, are:
A A
(9) Q =New*/P) (P/P'Q)/(3 —c)]e; P =((ew*/P)/(3—c)]e
where a hat denotes a percentage change.
Consider now three cases. First, with a linear market demand
function the term c=O. Accordingly, the pass—through of depreciation to the
prices is one third of marginal cost—price ratio for the foreign country.
Because we are in a situation of oligopoly the marginal cost—price ratio is
less than unity. The elasticity of industry price with re5pect to the
exchange rate is thus definitely a fraction and perhaps much less than a
half.
Next we look at a constant semi—elasticity demand curve, QAexp(—
aP). For this case the elasticity c=1, and the price elasticity is already
increased to a half of the marginal cost—price ratio. Going further to a
constant elasticity demand curve QAPa yields a value of c 1+1/a. Let a1
so that spending on the good is constant. In that case the elasticity of
price is equal to the marginal cost—price ratio.23
The examples show that the impact of exchange rate movements on
prices is far from straightforward. Market structure, conjectural variations
and functional form all come into play. Even though this application of
industrial organization ideas to the effects of exchange rate movements does
not emerge with firm results, it is quite apparent that it offers a major
avenue for theoretical research and for applied studies. Exchange rate
changes affect differentially home and foreign firms, to an extent which
varies between industries. Focusing on the adjustment to major exchange
rate movements may therefore help identify market structures and thus enrich
industrial organization research.
Commodity Prices:
One of the more interesting price effects of real exchange rate
movements between major industrial countries occurs in the area of
commodities. It is readily established that a real dollar exchange rate
depreciation in terms of value added deflators for manufactured goods)
will lead to a rise in the dollar price of commodities, and a rise in their
real price to U.S. users. Conversely, abroad the real price declines as does
the absolute price in foreign currencies.
This result can be seen by looking at the commodity market
equilibrium condition where J is the excess demand for any particular
commodity, say cotton:24
(10)
where p and p* are the national currency commodity prices and P and P* are
the deflators. Excess demand is a declining function of the real prices in
the two regions. In Figure 4 the market equilibrium schedule is shown as
downward sloping. Points above and to the right correspond to an excess
supply. Let R=P/eP* be the real exchange in terms of manufacturing
deflators rate, and which is shown as the ray OR through the origin. Using
the law of one price for commodities, p=ep*, and the definition of the real




A real appreciation of the dollar corresponds to a rise in R rotating
downward the OR ray. The model predicts a decline in real commodity prices
in the U.S. as a result of dollar appreciation. Equation (ha) shows that a
real appreciation of the dollar will lead to a decline in the real price of
commodities to U.S. users, and a real price increase abroad. Given the U.S.p/P
0
Figure 4 Real Exchange Rate Movements and




deflator,P, the nominal commodity price quoted in dollars will decline. In
this perspective the large dollar appreciation of 1980—85 helps explain the
sharp decline of dollar commodity prices in world trade.In fact though the
dollar appreciation and worldcyclical movements are not enough to explain
fully the decline in these prices.
Exchange Rates and inflation:
The impact of exchange rates on inflation is well—established for
any Banana Republic and, indeed, for any industrial country. The experience
of the l9BOs makes it clear that it even applies to the United States.
There are several channels through which exchange rates affect inflation.
The least controversial effect of exchange rates on inflation concerns the
prices of homogeneous commodities traded in world markets.
Changes in commodity prices influence directly the rate of inflation
for food and hence influence wages. They also affect industrial materials
costs in manufacturing. But exchange rates influence inflation also via
several other channels. Their influence is important because they are rapid
and quite pervasive.
One channel working in addition to commodity prices involves the
prices of traded goods and the prices of those goods directly competing with
traded goods. The industrial organization analysis considered above applies
to determine the magnitude and speed of response for prices. The less
monopolistic a market, and the lower entry costs, the more pervasive the
price effects.26
There are also inflation effects via wages. These can arise because
wages respond to the competitive pressure of an appreciation or depreciation
in affected industries. They also come about as wages respond to changes in
the cost of living.
Adding together these various channels yieldsapervasivepattern of
cost and price effects that are directly or indirectly associated with
exchange rate movements. It is interesting to note that in the U.S. the
magnitude of these effects is still under discussion. Estimates of the
impact of a 10 percent dollar appreciation on the price level range between
one and two percentage points. The reason it is so difficult to establish
the size of the impact is apparent. There have been only three recent
episodes involving a major change in inflation. Each coincided with an oil
price change, a large change in unemployment, and a major change in the
dollar. As a result it is nearly impossible to extract a precise estimate
for the size of each of these three elements in the inflation process.8
IV. The Political Economy of Overvaluation
The literature on political business cycles has drawn attention to
the systematic pursuit of macroeconomic goals on a timetable dictated by
political elections. The exchange rate fits very well into that scheme. It
8See Dornbusch and Fischer (19B4) Sachs (1985) and Woo (1984) on the
exchange rate effects on U.S. inflation.27
does so via its effects on output and inflation, but also as a highly
visible indicator of confidence in policy.
The political business cycle implication of exchange rate movements
is strongly enhanced by the relative timing of output and inflation results.
A real appreciation quickly raises real wages in terms of tradeables and
quickly reduces inflation. The impact on activity is much more gradual. The
implication of these timing relationships is that a policy of real
appreciation, conducted at the right time, can make an administration look
particularly successful at controlling inflation, while at the same time
delivering increases in real disposable income.
Diaz Alejandro (1966) was the first to draw attention to the fact
that devaluation in the short term may reduce activity, in addition to
having inflationary effects. Only in the long term do output and employment
expand. The reason is that in the short run a devaluation cuts real wages in
terms of tradeables thereby reducing purchasing power and the demand for
home goods. These income effects dominate in the short run. The neoclassical
substitution effects take time to build up. The short term effects are
sufficiently powerful to be highly relevant for political decision making.
The reverse side of this coin is overvaluation. In the short term it
involves less inflation and an increase in real income and hence it wins
popularity contests. Only over time, as substitution effects become
important and output declines due to the loss of competitiveness, do the
costs emerge. No wonder that overvaluation is a very popular policy, It28
created broad shortterm political support in Chile for Pinochet, in
Argentina for the policies of Martinez de Hoz, for the Thatcher government
in the U.K., and in the U.S. for Reaganomics.
Whether the policy mix was deliberate or not, there is little doubt
that for a while the real appreciation was celebrated as a mark of
achievement, rather than being seen as a highly destructive misalignment.
Only as the deindustrialization effects became visible, and politically
alarming did the policy makers back track and start viewing overvaluation
with concern. In the meantime it had bought a strong disinflation.
In the U.S. case the oil price decline of 1986 came just in time to
offset the cut in real income and the inflationary impact implied by dollar
depreciation. The timing of appreciation and depreciation thus looked like a
masterpiece of political economy. The only cloud remains the very serious
blow to industry, the eects of which do appear to persist even after an
already significant depreciation. Of course, in addition, there is the cost
of servicing the accumulated debt.
These episodes of overvaluation raise the interesting issue of why
an electorate would favor exchange rate misalignment. Given the welfare
costs associated with uneven tax structures over time, and the costs
resulting fromde—and reindustrialization, one would expect voters to favor
steady policies, rather than large fluctuations in the real exchange rate
and the standard of living. Yet the evidence runs counter to this
observation, overvaluation being one of the best tricks in the bag.29
There is an international dimension to the issue of inflation
stabilization via overvaluation. Under flexible exchange rates a tightening
of monetary policy exerts immediate disinflationary effects via currency
appreciation. When used by a large country, such a policy amounts to
exporting inflation. investigation of policy coordination and üf the
gametheoretic implications of these effects has been an important part of
international economics research.
A recent study by Edison and Tryon (1986) makes an important point
in this connection. The authors find that in simulations with the Federal
Reserve MCII model an asymmetry is apparent. For the U.S.—— the large
country—— foreign repercussions and the particulars of foreign policy
responses are relatively unimportant in their impact on inflation and
growth. For foreign countries, by contrast, the details of U.S. policy have
a major impact. This asymmetry should be expected to influence the nature of
Europe's policy responses to U.S. actions.
V. Excess Capital Mobility and Policy Responses
5See Cooper(199) Hamada (15) ,Buiterand Marston (1985) and Dudiz
and Sachs (1984).30
In this concluding section we consider policy issues that follow
from the the fact that macroeconomic disturbances exert significant excess
effects on real exchange rates, trade flows, and on the standard of living.
There are broadly two approaches: one is to accept the fact of international
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effectsof disturbances. The other is to interfere with capital flows in
order to pursue more freely macroeconomic objectives.
Target Zones and Exchange Rate Oriented Monetary Policy:
A strong case for some form of managed exchange rates is returning
in the aftermath of the extreme exchange rate fluctuations. In particular,
among those arguing for more fixed exchange rates are Williamson (i983) and
McKinnon (t984}.
The McKinnon position for a fixed exchange rate has at its center
the assumption that international portfolio shifts are behind exchange rate
movements. In an initial version of this argument shifts between M in one
country and another were the source of disturbance. Monetary authorities,
being committed to national monetary targets would not accommodate these
money demand shifts, and exchange rate volatility was seen as the inevitable
consequence. More recent versions of the hypothesis recognize that
international portfolio shifts are more likely to take the form of shifts in
the demand for interest bearing assets denominated in different currencies,
But the recommendation remains to fix exchange rates, using exchange rate31
oriented monetary policy to hold rates and accommodate money demand shifts.
In other words unsterilized intervention is to be used.
This policy recommendation prescribes exactly the wrong kind of
intervention. To offset the exchange rate impact of shifts in the demand for
bonds the currency denomination of the world bond portfolio should be
allowed to change. That means sterilized intervention is the correct answer.
In response to exchange rate appreciation the authorities should intervene,
leaving money supplies unchanged but increasing the supply of home bonds and
reducing the supply of foreign currency bonds. That, of course, is
sterilized intervention. The case for sterilized intervention is well—
established, and has been a basic principle of asset market management ever
since Pooles authoritative analysis of the choice between interest rate and
monetary targets. The remaining problem, of course, is to determine whether
it is portfolio shifts or shifts in fundamentals that are moving rates.
The case for fixing exchange rates whatever the source of
disturbance is advanced by those favoring target zones. Their position is
that exchange rates do not necessarily reflect fundamentals but rather
irrationality, band wagons, and eccentricity. The large movements in
exchange rates interfere with macroeconomic stability, but they can and
should be avoided by a firm commitment to exchange rate targets. Qn the
surface it is difficult to see any difficulty with this prescription, but on
further inspection two serious difficulties emerge. First, it is certainly
not an established fact that exchange rates move irrationally and without32
linksto fundamentals. Nor, if they do move in this way, is it clear that
they do so more than stock prices or longterm bond prices. Why single out
one price for fixing if it may mean that the other prices have to move even
further away from their fundamental equilibrium levels?
The second objectionconcerns a lack ofinstrument;. Governments are
unlikelytoagree on coordinating their fiscal policies. But if real
exchange rates are to remain fixed in the face of uncoordinated fiscal
policy changes then monetary accommodation is required. In the context of
the dollar appreciation of 1980—5, for example, that would have meant a more
agressively expansionary monetary policy in the U.S. and hence no
disinflation. It is questionable whether the objective of fixed rates is
sufficiently important to warrant bad monetary policy.Lo
Policies Toward Excess Capital Mobility:
But there is an alternative, extreme answer to international
exchange rate instability which is more attractive. The stickiness of wages
relative to exchange rates creates a macroeconomic externality which
possibly justifies closing or restricting some markets. Tobin (1982) has
made the case for throwing more sand into the international financial
system, so as to reduce the overwhelming influence of capital flows over
productiveactivityand trade. The proposal, known as the "Tobin tax",
involves a uniform ta on all foreign exchange transactions, to be levied in
10For a further discussion see Fischer (19B6).33
all countries of the world. The consequence of the tax is to make short term
hot money roundtrips unprofitable. Under this system capital flows would
therefore be more nearly geared to considerations of the long term
profitability of investment rather than the overnight speculation which now
dominates.
It might be argued that it is too late for stopping the flow of
international capital flows, that throwing sand in the wheels is no longer
sufficient. But why stop there and not use rocks? An operational way of
doing this is to use a managed rate for current account transactions so as
to achieve stability of inflation and of real activity and at the same time
employing a separate or dual exchange rate for capital account transactions.
If capital markets are irrational and primarily speculative it might be as
well to detach them altogether from an influence on real activity. Rather
than use scarce macro policy tools to adapt the real sector to the
idiosyncracy of financial markets, a separate exchange rate would detach the
capital account and deprive it from distorting influences on trade and
inflation.
11For a discussion of a dual rate system and extensive references to
the literature see Dornbusch (1986c).34
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